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MAKING ENDS MEET: USING A MARKET-
BASED APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE 
FOREIGN VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH 
THE AIR EMISSION STANDARDS OF 
MARPOL ANNEX VI* 
Xiaoxin Shi** 
INTRODUCTION 
Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) sets mandatory air emission 
standards for ocean-going vessels. Ratifying countries are required to 
enact legislation to implement MARPOL Annex VI (Annex VI) 
within their jurisdictions. The United States adopted Annex VI 
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 1 
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Two 
                                                 
*   The conclusions of this paper reflect the author’s findings between 
late 2013 to early 2014, when the paper was completed. Since then, there have been 
new developments in the Chinese policies and regulations on air emissions from 
ships and vessels. The most significant development is the new Emission Control 
Area (ECA) Implementation Plan, promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of 
Transport on December 2, 2015 (http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
12/04/content_5019932.htm). The Plan establishes three ECAs along China’s 
coast. Beginning on January 1, 2016, ports within the three ECAs will start to 
require ships to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel while berthing. Starting on January 1, 
2019, all ships will be required to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel when operating in the 
three ECAs. Before December 31, 2019, the Ministry of Transport plans to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the fuel switching program and decide whether to 
mandate all ships operate within the ECAs to switch to 0.1% sulfur fuel and 
whether to extend the geographical scopes of the ECAs.    
       **   Master of Philosophy 2010, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; 
J.D. 2015, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law.   
1   The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915 
(2008).  
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Emission Control Areas (ECAs) have been established under Annex 
VI in the U.S. territory.2 All vessels of United States registry or 
nationality to which MARPOL applies, if found to have violated the 
emission standards of ECAs within the U.S. territory, are subject to 
criminal or in rem civil liabilities.3 
The majority of the vessels calling at U.S. ports are registered 
in foreign countries, many of which have not yet fully enforced 
Annex VI through domestic legislation. 4  Employing judicial 
proceedings as the primary instrument to enforce the compliance of 
foreign flagged vessels, therefore, could be cumbersome and 
expensive administratively, especially considering the large number of 
calls at U.S. ports. This paper explores the perspectives of market-
based mechanisms, as supplements to judicial enforcement, to 
incentivize the compliance of foreign flagged vessels when operating 
in ECAs in the United States, and ultimately, to foster the 
enforcement of Annex VI in all major destinies of international 
shipping. 
This paper first introduces the regulative scheme to enforce 
MARPOL Annex VI standards on foreign ships operating in U.S. 
waters in Section II. Technological alternatives to achieve compliance 
and their constraints are also discussed, along with the review of 
                                                 
2   The North American Emission Control Area (ECA) was jointly 
proposed by the United States, Canada, and France, approved by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2010 and came into effect on August 1, 2012. See 
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], North American Emission Control Area, Res. MEPC.190(60) 
(Mar. 26, 2010). The United States also proposed the United States Caribbean Sea 
ECA, which was adopted by the IMO in 2011 and will take effect on January 1, 
2014. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission 
Control Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission 
Control Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 
13 and 14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Res. MEPC.202(62) (July 15, 
2011). 
3   33 U.S.C. § 1908. 
4   See U.S. DEP’T of TRANSP., VESSEL CALLS SNAPSHOT, 2011 (2013). 
In 2011, foreign-flagged vessels accounted for 89% of calls at U.S. ports. The 
number of U.S.-flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports had a range of 6,869 to 7,356 
between 2006 and 2011. Id. at 8; see also Sandra Y. Snyder, EPA’s Category 3 Marine 
Emission Standards: Mimicking MARPOL Annex VI or Mocking the Clean Air Act? 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2005) (most vessels entering U.S. ports are foreign 
vessels).  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
558 
relevant Annex VI provisions. Section III leads a comparison of 
Annex VI regulative schemes in the United States and a major marine 
trade partner, China. The comparison concludes that the United 
States and U.S. shipping companies are likely to bear unfair burdens 
administratively and financially in enforcing this multi-national 
convention due to the uneven regulative landscape globally. Having 
examined, from an economic perspective, the factors that could 
affect the effectiveness of enforcement measures, Section III 
recommends using incentive programs as an interim solution to 
solicit wider voluntary compliance while foreign countries such as 
China are yet to give effect to Annex VI through domestic legislation. 
Finally, Section IV discusses the feasibility of two main types of 
potential market-based incentive programs, cap-and-trade and 
emission credit trading, to provide non-complying foreign ships a 
“last offer” to avoid criminal penalties for violation of Annex VI 
while operating in U.S. waters. This paper favors an emission credit 
trading program, considering the increasing demand of international 
shipping service, in general, and the need to synergize technological 
developments in the ship building industry with the regulatory 
requirements of Annex VI. 
I.         ANNEX VI ENFORCEMENT SCHEME FOR FOREIGN FLAGGED 
VESSELS CALLING AT U.S. PORTS 
Foreign flagged vessels, just as U.S. flagged vessels, are 
regulated under the APPS when they operate in U.S. waters. Vessels 
have to use low-sulfur fuels, the quality and quantity of which are 
documented in Bunker Delivery Notes, and provide engine 
certificates to prove compliance with Annex VI standards. Civil or 
criminal liabilities may be imposed for violations. The U.S. Coast 
Guard, under an agreement with the EPA, has the authority to 
undertake onboard inspections. 
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A.         MARPOL Annex VI and Its Adoption in the United States 
MARPOL,5 as modified by Protocol of 1978,6 is the main 
international convention to prevent marine environment pollution 
from ocean-going vessels.7 Annex VI of MARPOL sets limits for 
NOx,
8 SOx,
9 and particulate matter (PM)10 emissions from ocean-
                                                 
5   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
Nov. 2, 1973, 1973 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL 
Annex VI].  
6   Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61. 
7   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
8   NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) forms through the diesel engine combustion 
process when the temperature reaches 2000 degrees Kelvin (equivalent to about 
3140 Fahrenheit) and the nitrogen in the air reacts with oxygen. The amount of 
NOx emission is not strongly affected by the specific fuel consumption, but is 
dependent on the temperature, pressure, and duration of combustion time of the 
engine fuel. Most nitrogen is oxidized into nitric oxide (NO) in the early stage of 
combustion. Some of the NO will convert to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O) during the later expansion process and in the exhaust. NOx is the 
mixture of NO, NO2, and N2O. One way of measuring NOx emission is based on 
the main engine’s rated speed, presented as revolutions per minute (rpm). See 
LAURIE GOLDSWORTHY, DESIGN OF SHIP ENGINES FOR REDUCED EMISSIONS OF 
OXIDES OF NITROGEN §2 (2002), available at 
http://www.flamemarine.com/files/AMCPaper.pdf. NOx emission is significantly 
higher when an engine operates at lower rpm (50 to 550); Lasse Johansson, 
Emission Estimation of Marine Traffic Using Vessel Characteristic and AIS-Data 
19 (Sept. 19, 2011) (Master’s thesis, Aalto University), available at 
www.lib.tkk.fi/Dipl/2011/ urn100529.pdf. NOx are precursor components for a 
photochemical reaction through which ozone is formed, and catalysts for the 
formation of acid rain. Id. at 5. Exposure to NOx, even if for a short term from 30 
minutes to 24 hours, would adversely affect the human respiratory system, 
including airway inflammation in healthy people and increased respiratory 
symptoms in people with asthma. Nitrogen Dioxide, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www. epa.gov/air/nitrogenoxides/health.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).  
9   SOx is the mixture of SO2, SO3, and SO4. The amount of SOx 
emission from vessels is directly related to the sulfur content of marine fuel burned. 
See Johansson, supra note 8; Zoi Nikopoulou et al., The Role of A Cap-and-Trade 
Market in Reducing NOx and SOx Emissions: Prospects and Benefits for Ships Within the 
Northern European ECA, 227(2) J. ENG’G FOR THE MARINE ENV’T 136, 136 (2013). 
Current world-wide average sulfur content in marine fuel is about 2.7% (27,000 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
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going vessels that are of 400 gross tonnages or more, and general 
enforcement and monitoring procedures. 11  The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations specialized agency 
responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution 
from ships, administers the enforcement of Annex VI worldwide.12 
Annex VI requires ratifying states to designate certain sea areas as 
ECAs where “mandatory measures” are required to control the 
emission of “NOx or SOx and [PM] or all three.”
13  These 
“mandatory measures” include limiting the sulfur content of fuel oil 
to reduce SOx and PM emissions through Regulation 14,
14 and 
prescribing three “tiers” of design standards for marine diesel engines 
                                                 
ppm). DONALD DABDUB & SATISH VUTUKURU, AIR QUALITY IMPACTS OF SHIP 
EMISSIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN OF CALIFORNIA 2 (2008). SOx can 
react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form small particles, which can 
penetrate deeply into lungs and cause or worsen respiratory diseases. Sulfur Dioxide, 
U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/health.html  (last updated June 28, 
2013). The SOx particles usually spread up to a few hundred kilometers depending 
on weather and wind conditions. In the presence of catalysts such as NOx, SOx can 
form H2SO4 causing acid rain. Johansson, supra note 8. 
10   PM (Particulate Matter), measured by PM2.5 (diameters of the 
particulates are less than 2.5 μm) and PM10 (diameters of the particulates are less 
than 10 μm), is produced during combustion in the form of soot, ash, organic and 
elemental carbon, SO4 and its associated water molecules. The amount of PM 
emission from vessels is linearly dependent on the sulfur content of the fuel oil. See 
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136-37; Johansson, supra note 8. PM contains 
microscopic solids and liquid droplets small enough to get into the lungs and cause 
a range of health problems to the lungs, respiratory systems, and heart. Particulate 
Matter, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/health.html (last updated Mar. 
18, 2013). 
11   See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5. 
12   See Introduction to IMO, ABOUT IMO, http://www.imo.org/ 
About/Pages/Default.aspx(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
13   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 2, ¶ 8. Emissions of 
NOx, SOx, and particulate matter from ocean-going vessels could cause adverse 
impacts to the environment and public health, including premature mortality, 
cardiopulmonary disease, lung cancer, chronic respiratory ailments, acidification 
and eutrophication. Id., Appendix III Criteria and Procedures for Designation of 
Emission Control Areas, ¶ 1.2. 
14   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14. In ECAs, upper 
limits of the sulfur content of fuel oil used on board ships are 1.50% m/m before 
July 1, 2010; 1.00% m/m on and after July 1, 2010; 0.10% m/m on and after Jan. 1, 
2015. Id. ¶ 8. 
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to control NOx emission through Regulation 13.
15  Depending on 
the vessel’s operational area and the time when the vessel engine is 
installed, different levels of NOx emission standard apply: Tier I 
standard applies to engines that are installed on a ship constructed 
between 2000 and 2011;16 Tier II standard applies to engines that are 
installed on ships constructed on or after January 2011, and if 
operating outside ECAs, ships constructed on or after January 1, 
2016;17 the most stringent Tier III standard applies to engines that 
are installed on ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016 if such 
ships operate in ECAs.18 Notably, at the 65th session meeting held in 
May 2013, the IMO considered the proposal of delaying the 
implementation of Tier III standards in ECAs until January 1, 2021.19 
The IMO eventually made only a partial compromise. At the 66th 
session meeting in 2014, the IMO decided to uphold the original 
                                                 
15   Considering the long service life of ocean-going vessels that may last 
for decades, MARPOL Regulation 13 sets three “tiers” of NOx emission standards 
for marine diesel engines that are installed on ships constructed between 2000 and 
2011, after 2011, and after 2016. These emission limits are relative, presented in 
formulas with the rated engine speed (rpm, revolutions per minute) as the variable. 
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13. 
16   For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after 
January 1, 2000 and before January 1, 2011, Tier I standard applies: NOx emission 
shall be under 17.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 
45×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; 
under 9.8 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex 
VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶ 3. 
17   For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after 
January 1, 2011, and ships constructed on or after January 2016 and operate outside 
ECAs, Tier II standard applies: NOx emission shall be under 14.4 g/kWh when the 
rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 44×n(-0.23) with “n” being the rated 
engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 7.7 g/kWh when the rated 
engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 
4, 5.1.3. 
18   Tier III standard applies to marine diesel engines that are installed 
on ships constructed on or after Jan. 1, 2016 and operate within ECAs. NOx 
emission from such ships shall be under 3.4 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is 
less than 130 rpm; under 9×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 
130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 2.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 
2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 5.1.1, 5.1.2. 
19   IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee 65th Session Pushes Forward 
with Energy-Efficiency Implementation, INT’L MAR. ORG. NEWS BRIEFS (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/18-
MEPC65ENDS.aspx.  
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2016 deadline for Tier III NOx requirement for marine diesel engines 
installed on new ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016, and 
accept the proposed delay until 2021 for engines installed on large 
yachts, viz. ships that are of less than 500 gross tonnage and 24 
meters or more in length.20 
Annex VI affords ratifying states with broad authority in 
enforcement. But such authority is qualified when the violation is 
caused by non-availability of low-sulfur fuels that are in compliance 
with MARPOL standards. To ensure compliance by ships, regardless 
of their country of registry, port states shall use “all appropriate and 
practicable measures of detection and environmental monitoring,” 
including inspection and bringing proceedings.21 Port states “shall 
[also] take all reasonable steps” to provide low-sulfur fuel at ports 
and terminals in their jurisdictions.22 If a ship furnishes evidence, 
primarily through documentation, of good faith attempts to secure 
compliant fuel yet no such fuel is available,23 the port state shall 
consider “not taking control measures.”24 Importantly, Annex VI 
explicitly provides that no deviation or delay of voyage should be 
required in order to achieve compliance.25 
The United States ratified Annex VI in 2008 26  and 
implemented the mandatory air emission standards domestically 
                                                 
20   IMO, REPORT OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
COMMITTEE ON ITS SIXTY-SIX SESSION MEPC 66/21, 36 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/MEPC66-report.pdf.  
21   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. 
22   Id. Regulation 18, ¶ 1. 
23   Id. ¶¶ 2.11, 2.12. 
24   Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5. 
25   Id. ¶ 2.2. 
26   Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments 
in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs 
Depositary or Other Functions (2015), available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ 
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202015.pdf. Seventy five 
countries have ratified MARPOL Annex VI. Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/ 
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed by 
clicking on the “excel chart listing ratifications by State”). Ratifying parties “shall 
co-operate” in enforcement of the provisions of this Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, 
supra note 5, Regulation 11, §1.  
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through amendments made in 2008 to the APPS27 and the Clean Air 
Act.28 Currently, two ECAs have been established covering virtually 
all U.S. coastlines. The North American ECA came into force on 
August 1, 2012, extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Pacific 
coast, the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the eight Hawaiian 
Islands.29 The United States Caribbean Sea ECA, covering coastal 
waters around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, was approved 
by the IMO in 2011 and became enforceable starting January 1, 
2014.30 Emissions of SOx, NOx, and PM are all regulated in both 
ECAs. 
B.         Enforcement Measures of MARPOL Annex VI on Foreign 
Flagged Vessels Operating in U.S. Waters 
MARPOL Annex VI affords no differentiated treatment of 
foreign flagged vessels and U.S. flagged vessels. 31  The APPS 
provides that Annex VI applies to all foreign flagged vessels “in” or 
bound for “a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or the internal waters 
of the United States.”32 
                                                 
27   33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915. 
28   Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006). 
29  IMO, North American Emission Control Area, Resolution MEPC. 
190(60) (Mar. 26, 2010); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-10-015, DESIGNATION OF 
NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM 
SHIPS (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f10015.pdf. 
30   IMO, Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control 
Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission Control 
Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 13 and 
14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Resolution MEPC.202(62) (July 15, 
2011); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-11-024, DESIGNATION OF EMISSION 
CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS IN THE U.S. CARIBBEAN 
(2011) 
31   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL), Art. 5(4) (with respect to the ship of non-parties to the 
convention, parties shall apply the requirements of the present convention as may 
be necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to such ships). 
32   33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B). 
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Civil penalties would be imposed for failure to provide 
documentation to prove compliance with Annex VI and each day of 
non-compliance would be considered a separate violation.33 For non-
compliant vessels, the U.S. EPA requires a corrective action plan 
signed by the ship owner or operator, and would report the non-
compliance to the ship’s country of registry.34 A class D felony is 
committed if a ship owner or operator “knowingly violates” Annex 
VI.35 Up to one half of the criminal fines may be paid to the “person 
giving information leading to conviction.”36 The U.S. Coast Guard is 
responsible for conducting ship inspections to verify compliance and 
investigations to establish criminal liability.37 
1.  Enforcement of Regulation 14 for SOx and PM emissions. - To 
comply with Regulation 14, ships must use low-sulfur fuel,38 be 
eligible for exemptions,39 or use “equivalents.”40 Because the price 
                                                 
33   33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008); OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL 
COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & 
FOREIGN VESSELS (2012). 
34  OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. 
COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012). 
35   33 U.S.C. § 1908, (a) (2008). 
36   Id. 
37   Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast 
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding 
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
38   Regulation 14 of Annex VI specifies that ships operating within an 
Emission Control Area shall use fuel oil with sulfur content lower than 1.00% 
m/m on and after July 1, 2010, and lower than 0.10% m/m/ on and after January 
1, 2015. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶ 4. The term “low-
sulfur fuel” in this paper is used broadly to include low-sulfur residual fuel, marine 
diesel oil, and marine gas oil. See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141. 
39   Regulation 3 of Annex VI provides that ships on trial for emission 
control technology research could be exempted from certain Annex VI provisions 
if compliance would impede the technology development. MARPOL Annex VI, 
supra note 5, Regulation 3, ¶ 2. See, e.g., Anna Lee Deal, Liquefied Natural Gas as a 
Marine Fuel: A closer look at TOTE’s Containership Projects 12 (Nat’l Energy Policy Inst. 
Working Paper, May 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.glmri.org/downloads/lngMisc/NEPI%20LNG%20as%20a%20Marin
e%20Fuel%205-7-13.pdf (TOTE obtained a waiver from the EPA and Coast 
Guard allowing the company to operate its ships using distillate fuels above 
2015 Shi 4:1 
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of low-sulfur fuels is much higher than that of standard fuels,41 a 
common practice to achieve compliance without splurging on cleaner 
fuel is to flush the fuel piping systems and fill the settling tanks with 
low-sulfur fuel only when approaching an ECA.42 But fuel switching 
is less straightforward than it seems. Changing fuels when the fuel 
temperature is still very high causes loss of engine power.43 Hence, 
vessels need to slow down when switching fuels to avoid 
malfunction.44 Additionally, because the low viscosity of low-sulfur 
fuel45 and the incompatibility of fuels46 when mixed harms diesel 
                                                 
regulative limit within the ECA during the conversion of these ships to liquefied 
natural gas so as to provide savings for the expensive environmental project). 
40   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
41   See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 16 (2010), available at www.schone 
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.  
42   See DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI 
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: 
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 17 (2009), available at 
www.dnv.com/binaries/marpol%20brochure_tcm4-383718.pdf; Chengfeng Wang 
et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Reducing Sulfur Emissions from Ships, 41 (24) ENV’T SCI. 
TECH. 8233, 8234 (2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/ 
10.1021/es070812w (switching from high-sulfur marine fuels with a sulfur content 
of 2.7%, the worldwide average, to low-sulfur marine fuels with sulfur content not 
exceeding 1.5% can reduce about 44% of SO2 emissions).  
43   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42. 
44  AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 17 (2010), available at http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternal 
PortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/ABS%20Advisories/
FuelSwitchingAdvisory (operational manual for fuel switching and training for staff 
is necessary).   
45   Main operational problems caused by the low viscosity of low-sulfur 
fuel are the reduced effectiveness of the fuel as a lubricant, loss of capacity in fuel 
supply and circulation pumps, and increased chances of leakage of fuel through the 
fuel pump barrel and plunger, and suction and spill valve push rods, and less energy 
generated per volume of fuel. AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING 
ADVISORY NOTICE 9, 10(2010). 
46   Incompatibility between different fuels would result in excessive 
sedimentation, sludging, and separator and filter problems. Hence, an additional set 
of fuel supply systems may be necessary. DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 
42. 
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engines and boilers, modifications to the fuel system are often 
necessary.47 
Annex VI encourages technological innovation by affording 
flexibilities in achieving compliance. Under Regulation 4, port states 
can allow “any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus . . . or other 
procedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods” so long as 
such alternatives are as effective in terms of emission reductions as 
the measures provided by Annex VI.48 If obtaining low-sulfur fuel is 
difficult, installing desulfurization units to achieve compliance is also 
technically feasible and permissible under MARPOL Annex VI.49 
But the high cost of such exhaust gas cleaning systems make this 
alternative unattractive.50 Even if the cost of a desulfurization unit 
itself is justified, its installment would probably require re-designing 
the fuel system due to the limited space in the engine room, and 
therefore lead to additional investments in vessel retrofitting. 51 
Another rapidly developing technology,52 because of the heightened 
environmental standards driven by MARPOL Annex VI, is using 
                                                 
47   See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 11-14  (2010) (modifications that may be needed include installing 
separate purifier and piping system for the low-sulfur fuels, additional fuel coolers 
if the vessel operates in summer and tropical conditions, special fuel injection 
pumps); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42 (ship owners may consider 
upgrading the capacity  of diesel tanks, or installing an additional set of service 
and settling tanks for low sulfur fuels).   
48   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
49  AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 7 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI 
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: 
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 16 (2009) (exhaust gas cleaning 
alternatives will also reduce PM emissions); see Chengfeng Wang et al., supra note 
42, at 8234. 
50   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49 (further technological 
developments or legislation are needed to lower the installation costs of a 
desulfurization unit, which is about $1 million (USD) to $2 million (USD), to make 
this alternative cost-beneficial). 
51   See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY 
NOTICE 12 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 17-18. 
52   See, e.g., Bridget C. Brett, Potential Market for LNG-Fueled Marine 
Vessels in the United States 34 (June 2008) (Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/44920#files-area 
(the four main manufactures who have the technology for LNG-fueled vessels are 
Rolls-Royce, GE, Wärtsilä, and MAN Diesel).  
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel. 53  The cost-
effectiveness of conversion to LNG varies from vessel to vessel, and 
is affected, primarily, by three factors: (1) the amount of time the 
vessel operates in an ECA; (2) LNG tanker size relative to the vessel 
size; and (3) LNG fuel availability.54 
However, Regulation 4 leaves the gap of identifying 
“equivalents,” i.e., alternative compliant measures, to the port states 
to fill in through bilateral negotiations. Currently, the United States 
requires foreign port states to submit to the U.S. Coast Guard 
proposals of equivalents for compliance. 55  The United States is 
seeking IMO’s coordination in identifying equivalents56 to minimize 
the need for enforcement actions if the U.S. Government disagrees 
with the equivalents approved by other port states.57 Absent IMO’s 
                                                 
53   Natural gas is a type of fossil fuel consisting mainly of methane 
(CH4). Id. Gaseous Natural gas transforms into liquid, called Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG), when the natural gas is cooled to -162 Celsius degrees. LNG creates the 
economics of scale by saving 99% of the space that natural gas with the same 
energy content in gaseous form would take. Id. at 15-16. NLG is considered the 
cleanest form of fuel because it contains no sulfur and thus all SOx emissions and 
most PM emissions are eliminated. Because LNG burns at lower temperatures than 
standard fuels, NOx emissions are also reduced significantly. Johansson, supra note 
8. The use of LNG as marine fuel became economically attractive when natural gas 
became cheaper than residual oil in early 2006. Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 
143. But the cost of LNG-fueled systems is generally 12% higher than the capital 
investment for a standard diesel engine. Bridget C. Brett, supra note 52, at 57. 
54   Anna Lee Deal, supra note 39, at 12 (LNG facilities are being 
planned for Cameron Parish and Port Fourchon in Los Angeles, along the 
Mississippi River, and in the Great Lakes region). 
55   U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter, 
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL 
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED 
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii). 
56   See Letter from Jeffrey G. Lantz, Dir., Commercial Regulations and 
Standards, U.S. Coast Guard, and Margo Tsirigotis Oge, Dir., Office of Transp. 
and Air Quality, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General of 
Int’l Mar. Org. (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/letter-epa-and-uscg-to-
imo.pdf. 
57   U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter, 
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL 
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED 
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).  
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intervention, countries such as the United States, which are enforcing 
Annex VI in advance of the other countries, might have to act as the 
de facto global administrator of Annex VI. 
The Bunker Delivery Note, where the quality and quantity of 
fuel oil supplied to vessels for combustion purposes is documented,58 
serves as the main evidentiary source for verifying compliance with 
Regulation 14. If the sulfur content of fuel oil exceeds Annex VI 
limits,59 and no exemption or equivalents apply, the ship owner 
should provide documentation to prove that best efforts were made 
to procure compliant fuel oil and notify the EPA of the non-
availability of such fuel oil before entering the ECA. 60  Taking 
together the regulative requirements and available technologies, 
owners of ships registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully 
enforced or no equivalents under Regulation 4 are formally 
established would probably have no choice but to change voyage 
plans, with the hope61 of avoiding criminal charges in the United 
States. 
2.  Enforcement of Regulation 13 for NOx emissions. - The 
reduction of NOx emissions is a function of multiple factors, 
including: engine design, engine age, fuel type, operational mode, 
energy efficiency,62 and any add-on emission reduction equipment.63 
                                                 
58   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 6. 
59   Id. Regulation 14, ¶ 4. 
60   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE NON-
AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION 
CONTROL AREA (2012), 3-4; OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-
CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012), 
§ 3. 
61   Evidence of good-faith attempt to secure low-sulfur fuel as required 
by Annex VI is only relevant in EPA’s determination of the appropriate 
administrative actions, but does not necessarily remove the possibility of finding 
criminal liability. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 4-5. 
62   NOx emission is actually a side effect of engine designs that aim to 
enhance energy efficiency by maximizing the completeness of fuel combustion, i.e., 
increasing the pressure and temperature of combustion process. PER KÅGESON, 
MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR NOX ABATEMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA 10 
(2009), available at 
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/2009_11_nox_report_baltic_sea.pdf 
(Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau and the 
European Federation for Transport and Environment). 
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To a certain extent, the level of compliance with the NOx emission 
standards of Annex VI reflects the sophistication of technological 
research and development in the shipbuilding industry. 64  The 
                                                 
63   See DAVID COOPER & TOMAS GUSTAFSSON, METHODOLOGY FOR 
CALCULATING EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS: 1. UPDATE OF EMISSION FACTORS 13-15 
(2004). The technical issues involved in restricting engine design to minimize air 
emissions are complex not only because the engine design has to fit various ship 
configurations but also because of safety concerns as ships must be able to depend 
on their sources of power in tough weather conditions and navigational hazards. See 
generally Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary Information to the Final Report of the 
Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological Developments to Implement the Tier III 
NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 
2013) (countries including the United States, Finland, Japan, Germany, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom reviewing technology developments to achieve Tier III 
standards for NOx emission that is to be in force in 2016). 
64   Several technically feasible means exist to achieve the relative 
standards for NOx emission under Annex VI. For low-speed two-stroke engines, 
compliance can be achieved through replacing conventional fuel valves by low-
NOx slide valves. For other engines, compliance is achieved through more complex 
engine modifications, including miller cycling, which achieves a lower temperature 
in the combustion chamber without a loss in power output; direct water injection, 
which rebuilds the engine to enable fresh water being sprayed into the combustion 
air to remove NOx from the exhaust gas; exhaust gas recirculation, where exhaust 
gases are filtered, cooled, and redirected into the engine to reduce the combustion 
temperature; selective catalytic reduction, a commercialized catalytic exhaust 
treatment system that is applicable to both new vessels and retrofit installations; 
humid air motor, which prevents NOx formation during combustion by adding 
water vapor to the engine’s combustion air; and low-NOx engines, which employs 
techniques to control fuel injection, spray formation, and fuel-air mixture to reduce 
temperature throughout the combustion process. See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 
10-13 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau 
and the European Federation for Transport and Environment); Seita Akimoto et 
al., Techniques for Low NOx Combustion on Medium Speed Diesel Engine, 2(1) BULLETIN 
OF THE MECH. ENG’G SCIENTIFIC J., 8 (2000), available at 
http://www.jime.jp/e/publication/ bulletin/english/pdf/mv28n012000p08.pdf; 
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 10 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European 
Environmental Bureau and the European Federation for Transport and 
Environment). Tier I and II standards of Annex VI, Regulation 13 are achievable 
with relatively simple engine modifications. See Johansson, supra note 8, at 20 (some 
engine manufactures have already been producing Tier II compliant engines for the 
last decade). The international shipbuilding industry is more concerned with the 
compliance with the Tier III standards. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary 
Information to the Final Report of the Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological 
Developments to Implement the Tier III NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex 
VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 2013). Currently, only three technologies could 
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primary evidentiary source for verifying compliance is the 
International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate,65 which should be 
issued to individual engines based on emission tests on the engine 
manufacturer’s test bed. 66  Therefore, although ship owners or 
operators seem to be the directly affected parties, the underlying 
rationale of Regulation 13 is to urge manufacturers to design vessels 
that meet higher emission standards by creating market demand from 
the ship owners and operators. 
In 2010, the EPA published a rule to regulate NOx emissions 
from new Category 3 engines with the same level of stringency as 
Annex VI, Regulation 13.67 The EPA rule applies to Category 3 
engines installed on U.S. vessels only.68 The regulated parties are 
mainly the manufacturers of Category 3 marine diesel engines,69 
most of which are incorporated in Finland, Germany, and Japan.70 
The U.S. vessel manufacturing industry is affected only to the extent 
that domestic vessel manufacturers have to adapt vessel designs and 
manufacturing processes to the new engine designs.71 
                                                 
meet Tier III standards: selective catalytic reduction, humid air motor, and liquefied 
natural gas engine. Jerzy Herdzik, Emissions from Marine Engines Versus IMO 
Certification and Requirements of Tier 3, 18 J. KONES POWERTRAIN & TRANS. 161, 
165-66 (2011) (IMO’s Tier III standards would require sharp increase in the 
development of new control systems adapted to the operation of compliant marine 
engines). 
65   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 1, ¶ 1; MARPOL 
Regulation 13, ¶ 7.3; MARPOL Appendix I, Form of International Air Pollution 
Prevention (IAPP) Certificate (Regulation 8). 
66   DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 9 (later onboard 
verification procedures are initially decided by the engine manufacturer). 
67   Category 3 engines refer to compression-ignition engines at or 
above 30 liters per cylinder. See 40 C.F.R. § 94, 1042 (2010). 
68   40 C.F.R. § 94.1 (b)(2). See also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 
404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the EPA’s decision not to regulate 
Category 3 on foreign-flagged vessels because of particular deference to agency 
decision under the Clean Air Act).   
69   U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: 
CONTROL OF EMISSION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM CATEGORY 3 MARINE DIESEL 
ENGINES (2009), pt. 1 at 5-6, pt. 8 at 3.  
70   Id. 
71   Id. 
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For foreign vessels, the NOx emissions are instead controlled 
directly through implementing ECAs.72 Hence, the compliance of 
foreign vessels with NOx emission standards relies largely on whether 
their countries of registry have given effect to Annex VI through 
legislation. The U.S. EPA plays only a secondary role in the sense 
that it has no direct control over the upstream regulatory necessities, 
viz., engine designs of the vessels that are registered and 
manufactured in foreign countries. As such, an “administrative 
vacuum” exists in enforcing Regulation 13 on foreign vessels.73 
II.         CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING ANNEX VI: AN UNEVEN 
GLOBAL REGULATIVE LANDSCAPE 
In the United States, APPS sets a rather low threshold for 
finding criminal liability, risking the efficiency and economy of the 
administrative enforcement process. In most foreign countries that 
are major maritime trading partners with the United States, however, 
Annex VI has not been fully enforced. The disparity between the 
compliance environments at calling ports in different countries needs 
to be addressed to minimize the enforcement cost borne by the 
United States in implementing Annex VI. 
A.         “Knowing Violation” as the Legal Threshold for Finding 
Criminal Liability 
The owner or other parties involved in a non-compliant 
foreign flagged vessel who “knowingly violates” MARPOL would be 
criminally charged. 74  But APPS provides no other language to 
substantiate the threshold of “knowing violation.” The EPA 
guidelines indicate indirectly that criminal liability could be found if 
the ship has previously reported non-availability of compliant fuel oil, 
or if insufficient quantity of compliant fuel oil is obtained at U.S. 
ports even though the ship operator knows that the vessel will return 
                                                 
72   40 C.F.R., Summary III, A.  
73   See generally Snyder, supra note 4, at 1072-80 (criticizing EPA’s 
Category 3 rule as inadequate for not extending to foreign vessels).  
74   33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a) (2008). 
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to the ECA and complaint fuel oil is unavailable outside the ECA.75 
The EPA also refuses to consider the cost of compliant fuel oil as a 
relevant factor to establish “unavailability.”76 
Recent cases regarding enforcement of MARPOL on foreign 
vessels indicate that federal courts are unlikely to limit finding 
criminal liability, especially when the violation is caused by an 
affirmative action, as opposed to omissions. In United States v. Pena, 
the court confirmed the conviction of a surveyor of an institute 
organized in Florida for failing to conduct the required survey under 
MARPOL Annex I of a Panamanian-flagged vessel.77 The court 
found “knowing violation” was established when the non-compliant 
performance of the ship had been in place for months and the 
defendant surveyor did not test the parts of the ship that he knew 
were not functional.78 
MARPOL Annex I was enforced in a more aggressive 
manner in United States v. Sanford Ltd.79 Defendant Sanford is a 
fishing company incorporated in New Zealand and transports cargo 
to U.S ports on a regular basis. Sanford was charged, inter alia, for not 
recording discharges of oily bilge water in the vessel’s Oil Record 
Book (ORB), even though such omission occurred in the high seas 
before entering U.S. water and would not necessarily result in 
criminal liability under the MARPOL enforcement regulations in 
New Zealand.80 The court upheld the conviction on two grounds. 
First, although finding APPS does not intend to apply 
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that the triggering point of the 
violation is “at the moment a vessel enters a U.S. port with an 
                                                 
75   See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE 
NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN 
EMISSION CONTROL AREA (2012), at 8.  
76   Id. at 5. 
77   United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1143-44 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 573 (2013) (upholding U.S. jurisdiction over foreign 
flagged vessels).   
78   Pena, 684 F.3d, 1152-53. 
79   United States v. Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.C. 2012) 
(finding that the law-of-the-flag doctrine does not bar the U.S. Government from 
prosecuting defendants for their violations of MARPOL implemented by the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships). 
80   Id. at 12. 
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inaccurate ORB” rather than when the omission occurred.81 Second, 
the court held that the defense of being subjected unfairly to the 
peculiar rules of a foreign sovereign does not prevail when the U.S. 
and foreign regulations for implementing MARPOL are “on their 
face . . . functionally identical.”82 However, the court narrowed this 
holding to cases where the regulations of the United States and the 
foreign country are unlikely to be in conflict.83 The court noted 
implicitly that a “balancing of the delicate and important interests of 
comity and sovereignty” might be needed in some cases.84 
In a similar case, United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A.,85 defendant 
Ionia, incorporated in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, was 
convicted for making false entries in the ORB to conceal illegal 
discharges of oily wastewater and obstructing a federal investigation. 
The court upheld the order of forty-eight months of probation, a 
corrective ship management plan, and a fine of $4.9 million (USD).86 
The court held that the amount of the criminal fine, although not 
calculated based on the sentencing guidelines, was nevertheless 
reasonable given the culpability of the violation.87 The sentencing 
was enforced through several hearings during the subsequent three 
years.88 
B.         Enforcement of Annex VI Outside the United States: China 
as an Example 
                                                 
81   Id. at 14-15.  
82   Id. at 21-23 (finding the discrepancies as to the interpretation of 
“machinery space” insufficient to support a finding of material difference between 
the U.S. and New Zealand regulations). 
83   Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d, 22. 
84   Id. 
85   United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009).  
86   Id. at 310. 
87   Id. 
88   See United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 
WL 5304117 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-
CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126089 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2011); United 
States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87122 
(D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C. Conn. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Ionia 
Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109063 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 11, 2010); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134(JBA), 2009 
WL 3074727 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2009). 
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The benefits of implementing Annex VI will be fully realized 
only when both U.S. and foreign vessels actually operate under the 
same environmental standards.89 Not all countries, however, perceive 
air emissions from marine vessels as a significant pollution source as 
the United States does.90 A review of regulations and policies on air 
pollution control in China, an example of one of the largest 
waterborne trading partners with the United States,91 shows that 
such foreign countries are unlikely to enact legislation in the near 
term to implement Annex VI as stringently as the United States. 
China has not enacted particular laws or regulations to 
implement Annex VI,92 and will not do so, at least, until after 2015. 
                                                 
89   See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, pt. 6 at 1.  
90   Although the prioritization of sectors targeted in a country’s air 
pollution control strategy is not always “objective,” numbers do found a persuasive 
basis. In the United States, the transport sector contributes to about 54% of total 
NOx emissions. ANDREW AULISI ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING 
IN U.S. STATES: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OZONE TRANSPORT 
COMMISSION (OTC) NOX BUDGET PROGRAM 3 (Margaret B. Yamashita ed., World 
Resources Institute, 2005), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
nox_ghg.pdf (estimation based on inventory data released in EPA reports 
reviewing the performance of OTC NOx Budget Program); see also The 2011 
National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last updated on Dec. 24, 
2013), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011 inventory.html (emission sources 
from transport sector contributes about 62% to the total NOx emissions from fuel 
combustion, gas stations, industrial processes, and road and non-road mobile 
sources). In other countries, the transport sector may contribute less to the total air 
pollutant emission by percentage than that in the United States due to the 
differences in industrial structure. In China, for example, the transport sector 
contributes only about 9% to the total NOx emissions in 2005. J. Xing et al., 
Projections of Air Pollutant Emissions and Its Impacts on Regional Air Quality in China in 
2020, 11 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 3119, 3129 (2011), available at 
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/3119/2011/acp-11-3119-2011.html. The 
major source of NOx emissions is instead power plants. Id. at 3128. 
91   The waterborne container trade between China and the United 
States was at 29,477,025 TEUs in 2012. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners (Sept 26, 2013), http://www. 
marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
92   China ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2010. Status of Conventions, 
INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/ 
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 
2012). Ratifying parties “shall co-operate” in enforcement the provisions of this 
Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶1.  
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Only a set of quasi-regulative rules promulgated by the Ministry of 
Transport in 2010 requires that ships should hold certificates issued 
by the Marine Administration in accordance with international 
treaties that the Chinese government entered into or ratified. 93 
However, this 2010 rule does not make reference to MARPOL 
Annex VI or specify what certificates the ships should hold. 94 
Provisions of the 2010 rule are so generally stated that its on-the-
ground enforcement cannot be realized until the adoption of more 
specific regulations or plans.95 
Moreover, the approach employed by Chinese policies is 
rather different from the MARPOL approach to control air emission 
from waterborne transport. Once the numbers of national emission 
caps and energy saving objectives are established96 for every five-year 
planning period,97 the air pollution control policies for different 
sectors and sub-sectors are essentially allocations of the national 
goal.98 Hence, air emissions from the marine transport sector are 
                                                 
93   Zhonghua renming gongheguo chuanbo jiqi youguan zuoye 
huodong wuran haiyang huanjing fangzhi guanli guiding (中华人民共和国船舶及
其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定) [Management Provisions on 
Preventing Pollution of Marine Environment from Ships and Related Activities of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, Oct. 8, 
2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), art. 1, 5, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-
12/02/content _1758149.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
94   Id.  
95   See Nengye Liu & Frank Maes, Prevention of Vessel-Source Marine 
Pollution: A Note on the Challenges and Prospects for Chinese Practice under International Law, 
42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 356, 358-59 (2011), available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320.2011.619373 - 
.Usf9sRr8U5s. 
96   See Guowuyuan guanyu yingfa shi’erwu jieneng jianpai zonghexing 
gongzuo fang’an de tongzhi (国务院关于印发”十二五”节能减排综合性工作方
案的通知) [State Council’s Notification on Promulgating the Integrated Work Plan 
for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction for the Twelfth Five Year] 
(promulgated by the State Council Aug. 31, 2011, No. 26), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm.  
97   See The First Ten Five-Year Plans of the People’s Republic of China, THE 
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 20, 2006), 
http://www.gov.cn/test/ 2006-03/20/content_231421.htm.  
98   See Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shipfting 
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA QUARTERLY 791, 796-800 (2005), available 
at http://falcon.arts. cornell.edu/am847/pdf/Soft%20Centralization%20Final.pdf; 
see also Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 
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regulated based on the total amount of emissions for specified 
pollutants and reduction in energy consumption, rather than 
prescribing standards for marine fuels and diesel engines as 
MARPOL Annex VI does.99 Currently, China is in the twelfth five-
year planning period, which runs from 2011 until 2015. 100  The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction, 
one of the master national policies for this planning period, sets a 
target of reducing energy consumption of vessels for marine and 
inland waterway transportation by 10% to 6.29 kilograms of coal 
equivalent per ton of goods per 1,000 kilometers by 2015.101 
                                                 
49(4) J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1082-84, 1086-92 (2011), available at 
www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/04_Xu.pdf (the functioning of Chinese government is not 
a mixture of de facto federal state and a centralized regime: regional 
decentralization exists as to economic governance, while other political and policy 
decision-making processes follows closer to an authoritarian regime).  
99   See Jiakuai tuijin luse xunhuan ditan jiaotong yunshu fazhan zhidao 
yijian (加快推进绿色循环低碳交通运输发展指导意见) [Guiding Principles on 
Promoting Green Low-Carbon Transport Development] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Transport, No. 323, May 22, 2013) (“Guiding principles (zhidao yijian)” are 
less rigid policies than “Opinions (yijian).”), available at Ministry of Transport website: 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201305/t2013052
7_1417741.html;(2013年运输行业节能减排工作要点) [Key Tasks for Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction in 2013 in Transport Sector] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Transport, No. 37, Jan. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/ 
07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201301/t20130118_1356606.html; Gonglu shuilu jiaotong 
yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规
划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in 
Road and Water Transportation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 
2011), available at 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xi
angguanzhengcefagui/201110/t20111010_1064457.html. 
100   See Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shierge wunian guihua 
gangyao (国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Outline of the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development] (promulgated by 
the State Council, Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/ 
2011lh/content_1825838_2.htm. 
101   Jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (节能减排”十二五”规划) [The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction] (promulgated 
by the State Council, No. 40, Aug. 6, 2012), Table 1, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2217291.htm (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2013).  
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Subsequently, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) announced in 
the sector’s leading policy102 that building green ports would be a 
major task during the twelfth five-year planning period. This “green 
port” policy trickles down to retrofitting port infrastructures to use 
alternative powers in place of diesel fuel, including upgrading rubber-
tired gantry to use electricity instead of fuel,103 scaling up the use of 
shorepower and solar power at ports, and establishing automatic 
management systems to monitor energy consumption on vessels.104 
Government funding for such projects generally shall be no more 
than ¥10 million (RMB), according to the Temporary Management 
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission 
Reduction Projects in the Transport Sector issued jointly by the 
MOT and the Ministry of Finance.105 
                                                 
102   Gonglu shuilu jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公
路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for 
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in Road and Water Transportation] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 2011), section 4, sub-section 7, 
available at http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/ 
zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xiangguanzhengcefagui/201110/t201
11010_1064457.html (last visited Oct 22, 2013) 
103   Rubber-tiered gantry (RTG), also called transtainer, is a mobile 
gantry crane used for stacking containers at container terminals. Diesel rubber-tired 
gantry (RTG) can represent a large percentage of a port’s total fuel consumption. 
Electricity-powered RTGs offer a promising alternative in face of the increasing 
price of diesel fuel and more stringent ambient air standards. The cost of 
converting a diesel RTG to an electric cable reel connected one is approximately 
$250,000. The effectiveness of such fuel-to-electricity conversion depends primarily 
on the availability of electrical infrastructures connecting to the port, the remaining 
service life of the RTG, and how much the RTG is used. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH 
INST., ELECTRIC CABLE REEL RUBBER-TIRED GANTRY CRANES: COSTS AND 
BENEFITS 1, 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=0000000
00001020646. 
104   Id.  
105   Jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai zhuanxiang zijin guanli zhanxing 
banfa (交通运输节能减排专项资金管理暂行办法) [Temporary Management 
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Projects 
in the Transport Sector] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Transport, No. 374, June 20, 2011), chapter 2, art. 7, available at 
http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/ 
zhengwuxinxi/tongzhigonggao/201107/t20110704_570700.html. 
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Recently, the Chinese government heightened the sulfur 
content standard for marine fuel oils. Under the new standard, the 
maximum sulfur content of fuel oils shall be 3.5% m/m,106 which 
comports with Regulation 14 of Annex VI for ships operating 
outside ECAs.107 Thus, even if all ships registered in China use fuel 
oils with less than 3.5% m/m sulfur content, many of them would 
still fail the U.S. standard since virtually all U.S. waters are in ECAs, 
where the sulfur content of fuel oils should be less than 1.00% m/m 
starting from July 1, 2010108 and 0.10% m/m starting from 2015.109 
The above review of policies and regulations shows that 
marine vessels have not moved to the top of the air-cleaning agenda 
of the Chinese government. 110  Any further legislation or 
policymaking to give effect to the terms of MARPOL Annex VI in 
China would probably only take place during the next planning 
period at the earliest, viz., after 2015. Given this timing, China would 
have to implement the most stringent emission standards provided in 
Regulation 13 and 14 by the implementation schedule specified in 
Annex VI to be comparable with U.S. standards.111 
C.         Deficiencies of the Current Enforcement Mechanism 
1.  Deficiencies on a global scale. - A compliance environment 
that exposes foreign ships with rotating crews, trading at different 
ports where the stringency of a treaty is approached differently, poses 
                                                 
106   Chuanyong ranliaoyou (船用燃料油) [Marine Fuel Oil Standard] 
(issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine, Standardization Administration, GB/T 17411-2012, July 1, 2013).   
107   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶1.2. 
108   Id. ¶ 4.2. 
109   Id. ¶ 4.3. 
110   See also Qiang Zhang et al., Cleaning China’s Air, 484 NATURE 161, 
161-62 (2012) (curbing emissions from power plants and coal consumption in 
general remains the priority for tackling air emission for China given the country’s 
continued rapid economic growth, even though tremendous governmental efforts 
have been made to raise the operational standards for coal-fired power plants).  
111   Recall that starting from January 1, 2015, the sulfur content of fuel 
oil used on board ships shall be less than 0.10% m/m and Tier III standard for 
NOx emission would start to apply in ECAs for engines installed on ships that are 
constructed on or after January 1, 2016. MARPOL Regulation 13, ¶ 5.1.2; 
MARPOL Regulation 14, ¶ 4.3. Again, MARPOL needs to be cited to earlier (see 
earlier notes) or if this is MARPOL VI it needs to be cited as such. 
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a daunting management challenge. 112  The uneven enforcement 
landscape for MARPOL Annex VI is the quintessence of a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” situation 113  for which international 
environmental conventions that are not self-executing are often 
criticized.114 If ratifying countries do not take enforcement measures 
of similar stringency, 115  some countries could obtain economic 
                                                 
112   See, e.g., Claudia Copeland, Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and 
Regulations, and Key Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 26 (2010), 
http://www. eoearth.org/view/article/51dac6ac5948612528000716/ (the General 
Accounting Office found that the process for referring cruise ship violations to 
other countries does not appear to be working and recommended that the IMO 
encourage member countries to respond when pollution cases are referred to 
them). 
113   The Prisoner’s Dilemma was initially developed by Merrill Flood 
and Melvin Dresher in 2950, later named by A.W. Tucker. Paul W. Grimm & 
Heather Leigh Williams, The Judicial Beatings Will Continue Until Moral Improves: The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT. 
L.F. 107, 108-09 (2013) [hereinafter Grimm & Williams, Judicial Beatings] (citing to 
Robert Axelrod’s book “The Evolution of Cooperation”). The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
is one of the models in the game theory trying to explain how self-interested, 
rational individuals interact in a collective decision-making process. MARTIN J. 
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 15-18 (1994). It 
involves a scenario where two prisoners, retained separately under interrogation, 
must decide whether to keep silent or to confess. Grimm & Williams, Judicial 
Beatings, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 108 (2013). Under the theoretical model of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rationality exercised by individuals for their best interests, 
instead of leading to a scenario where all individuals’ interests are maximized, 
instead tends to lead to inefficient resource allocation, suboptimal environmental 
standards, and hence harms the overall welfare of the group of individuals. See 
Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275-76 (1997).   
114   See ROSS A. KLEIN, GETTING A GRIP ON CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION, 
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 17-28 (2009), 
http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/CruiseShipReport_Klein.pdf (criticizing 
MARPOL for not being self-executing resulting in its low on-the-ground 
effectiveness); John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 191 (2001) (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity is another example where the Convention carries no real consequences 
for those ratifying countries which take no action, such as domestic legislation, to 
enforce the terms of this international agreement).  
115   See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization 
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 429 (1989) (country has 
incentive to develop a competitive advantage in industrial production by enjoying 
the benefits of the other countries’ environmental protection activities, while taking 
limited action at home country).  
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advantages by holding to more relaxed environmental standards 
intentionally. 116  This “race to the bottom” phenomenon, or 
“reluctance to move to the top” phenomenon, in response to 
regulations on maritime safety and pollution has already been 
observed in the international shipping industry.117 Therefore, if land-
based transport routes are available to replace certain sections of 
marine transport routes, the business interests of U.S. ports would 
likely be adversely affected by the heightened environmental 
standards, which often implicate increased operational cost for 
shipping.118 
                                                 
116   See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: 
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 67, 80-82 (1996) (states respond to the interstate competition for 
industry by lowering regulatory standards forming a “race to the bottom” 
phenomenon, which might be remedied by promulgating federal laws); but see 
Karen Palmer et al., Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost 
Paradigm, 9(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 129-30 (1995) (arguing generally that no clear 
evidence to establish the conclusion that higher environmental regulation in the 
United States has a large adverse effect on economic competitiveness on U.S. 
firms, especially considering that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is 
actually similar to that of European regulations).  
117   Alan Khee-Jin Tan, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE 
LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 7 (James Crawford & John 
S. Bell eds., 1st ed. 2006) (whenever any actor in the shipping industry tries to 
maintain safety and pollution prevention standards, he is faced with the prospect of 
losing business to cheaper standards; as a result, the proliferation of new rules and 
regulations confers a competitive advantage on sub-standard operators). But the 
other countries disadvantaged by the “race to the bottom” might push legislation to 
raise the environmental standard globally, when their firms already developed or 
have the capacity to develop the advanced manufacturing technologies to achieve 
such higher standards, to turn themselves back to the leadership in the industry. See 
RIMA MICKEVICIENE, THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION 202, 216 
(Piotr Pachura eds. 1st ed. 2011) (a large part of technical innovations in the 
shipbuilding industry has to be presented in relation to the goal of reducing exhaust 
gas emissions).   
118   See Erin Tanimura, Pacific Merchant II’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
Ruling: Expanding State Control over Commerce Through Environmental Regulation, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 419, 421-26 (2013) (arguing that the court’s ruling in favor of 
California’s more stringent air emission standards on ships would disadvantage 
business and commercial interests as these standards would increase the operational 
cost by $30,000 (USD) per call); Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, 
Balancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of Marine Transportation, 
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D 15, 458, 459 (2010) (a side-effect of 
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Theoretically, the threat of civil penalties and criminal 
punishment would induce the shipping industry, and eventually the 
shipbuilding manufacturing industry, to modify their practice as a 
whole to internalize the business externalities, viz., the environmental 
and health impacts caused by air emissions from marine vessels.119 
But before reaching that point, the industries have to first internalize 
the increased shipping costs due to delays in voyages to obtain 
compliant fuels,120 or otherwise face possible civil penalties. The 
industry tends to respond by using cost-saving measures that usually 
require less capital investment than new engine designs or ship 
retrofitting.121 Generally speaking, under the pressure of both the 
higher environmental standards and continued preference of cheaper 
carriers from powerful clients such as oil companies,122 ship owners 
would choose to register their international vessels in countries where 
MARPOL is implemented much less seriously,123 even though no 
differentiated treatment based on flag state is afforded officially,124 
hire cheaper and usually ill-trained seafarers who are more likely to 
cause environmental violations, and demand standard quality ships to 
                                                 
requiring speed reduction, a way to reduce ship emissions, in short but sometimes 
deep sea shipping may induce a shift to more environmentally intrusive land-based 
transport modes).  
119   See Stephen J. Darmody, The Oil Pollution Act’s Criminal Penalties: On 
a Collision Course with the Law of the Sea, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 118-21 
(1993). 
120   See infra text accompanying notes 127-34. 
121   See generally Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 145 (for a Selective 
Catalytic Reduction system for NOx control, a 2.7 years of payback period is 
required for 100% return on investment; for a Humid Air Motor system for NOx 
control, a 3.8 years of payback period is needed for a 51% return on investment for 
a new ship, and a 4.2 years of payback period is needed for a 37% return on 
investment for retrofitting).   
122   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 40 (the volatile freight rates 
during the past few decades have caused oil companies to count for the cheapest 
available rate at any time, and therefore tend to favor sub-standard operators).  
123   See generally DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
FOREIGN-FLAG OPERATING COSTS 68-69 (2011), available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_
Operating_Costs.pdf (the higher environmental costs when operating in the United 
States is one main reason accounting for the higher operational costs incurred by 
U.S. flagged vessels than foreign-flagged vessels). 
124   See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B) (2008). 
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be delivered at the lowest price possible.125 In response, shipbuilders 
often use cheaper materials, rendering ships more vulnerable.126 
For different reasons, including the limited time and 
resources of administrative agencies to undertake thorough 
inspections or bring prosecutions, or simply “good luck,”127 the 
number of vessels that operate in full contravention with MARPOL 
remains “unacceptably high,” both in the United States 128  and 
internationally.129 Apparently, some vessels are still able to continue 
business as usual by taking the risk of being caught then 
implementing those cost-saving measures discussed above. 130 
Arguably, one reason for the large number of violations could be that 
the punishment is not severe enough to carry a sufficient deference 
effect. However, given the precedents of imposing a criminal fine in 
the millions of dollars,131 a more plausible inference should be that 
the MARPOL standards have not operated in synergy with the 
economics of the maritime transport sector.132 In fact, this lack-of-
                                                 
125   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 6. 
126   Id. 
127   See ROSS A. KLEIN, supra note 114 (many reports of MARPOL 
violation have come from citizen observations and therefore detection of violations 
could be missed, unless the cruise ship staff and the company for which they work 
report voluntarily); Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, United States: Current 
Trends in MARPOL Enforcement – Higher Fines, More Jail Time, The Banning of Ships, and 
Whistleblowers Galore, MONDAQ (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/148086/Marine+Shipping/Current+Tre
nds+In+MARPOL+Enforcement+Higher+Fines+More+Jail+Time+The+Banni
ng+Of+Ships+And+Whistleblowers+Galore (more than 50% of the MARPOL 
cases in recent years stem from whistleblowers making reports to the Coast Guard). 
But the number of whistleblowers for Annex VI violations might decrease as it 
would be rather difficult to detect excessive air emission with naked eyes.  
128   David P. Keho, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the 
Boat? 39 ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (2009). 
129   ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), COST 
SAVINGS STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR 47 (2003). 
130   See generally id. at 4 (about 5,000 to 7,500 substandard commercial 
vessels are engaged in international trade). 
131   Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310 (imposing a fine of $4.9 million (USD)).  
132   This inference should not be simply rephrased as “the compliance 
cost is too high.” Virtually no regulated party would ever gratefully applaud the 
reasonableness or inexpensiveness of compliance measures. The meaning of 
“synergy” can be understood from two perspectives: monetary cost and the 
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synergy could well be the reason for IMO to finally consider and 
agree with delaying the implementation of Tier III standards for NOx 
emission for five years. The industry is frustrated with this expensive 
“green storm.”133 More incentives in the enforcement regime for 
compliance with MARPOL seem to be needed.134 
                                                 
prevalence of technologies to achieve compliance in the regulated industry. Of 
course, the rare availability of necessary technologies that can be commercialized in 
the market is accountable for the high monetary cost. See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET 
AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (concluding based on analysis of European shipping 
industry that Annex VI requirements may be quite costly for the shipping industry, 
driving up the cost by 25.5% to 40% depending on the specific type of low-sulfur 
fuel used).  
133   Remarks of Christopher Koch, President & CEO of the World 
Shipping Council, World Trade Association of Philadelphia 2 (Nov. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.worldshipping.org/public-
statements/CLK_Philadelphia_Speech__November_8_2013.pdf (criticizing 
MARPOL Annex VI as “the single most expensive environmental regulation the 
shipping industry has ever faced”). 
134   See KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 17 (MARPOL is far from 
really working).  
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2.  Deficiencies viewed from the perspective of foreign flagged vessels. - 
One chief concern has been the non-availability of low-sulfur fuels 
since IMO’s adoption of Annex VI. In the final working group report 
to IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) at the 
57th session meeting in 2008, the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association135 cautioned that the oil 
industry did not expect marine fuels at 0.10% and 0.50% sulfur 
content would be available to all regions by desired dates of 2015 and 
2020, respectively.136 
The availability of low-sulfur fuel under the scenario of full 
compliance with MARPOL Annex VI is too complex an issue to be 
generalized by a “yes” or “no” conclusion.137 The prediction of 
availability depends on the combination of multiple factors including 
the enforcement area, fuel price, cargo load, volume of pre-purchased 
fuels under the contracts between vessel operators and fuel suppliers, 
projected capacity of refineries, shipping route, number of suppliers 
at specific ports, and the type of fuel used. 138  Although some 
                                                 
135   The Int’l Petroleum Industry Envtl. Conservation Ass’n (IPIECA) 
is the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues 
veering over half of the world’s oil production, formed in 1974 following the 
launch of the United Nations Environment Program. IPIECA is the industry’s 
principal channel of communication with the United Nations. About Us, IPIECA: 
THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES (2013), http://www.ipieca.org/about-us. 
136   See IMO, Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships: Report of the Working 
Group on Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code, MEPC 57th Session Agenda Item 4, 
MEPC 57/WP.7 (Apr. 4, 2008); see also MARPOL Annex VI Revision Signals New 
Low-Emissions Era, Annex VI Special Report (May 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/magazine.download?magazine_item_id=120 
(Linda K. Wright, Global Director at ExxonMobil Marine Fuels, warned at the 
29th International Bunker Conference held in April 2008 that there is no guarantee 
that sufficient low-sulfur fuel will be available and the oil industry’s misgivings 
about the significant refinery investment cost associated with producing more low-
sulfur fuels). 




138   See id. at 53-60, 62-67, 76; MICHELLE KOMLENIC ET AL., 
EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABILITY OF LOW SULFUR MARINE DISTILLATE FUEL 
FOR OCEAN-GOING VESSELS THAT VISIT CALIFORNIA 9-12 (2008), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2008/fuelogv08/ appffuel.pdf. 
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estimation findings are more optimistic than others, the common 
conclusion is that low-sulfur fuel (less than 0.5% m/m sulfur 
content) shortages exist mainly in Central and South America and 
Asia, especially in China,139 Japan, and Korea.140 
Ideally, port states should exercise their responsibilities under 
Annex VI to formally establish equivalents, such as add-on exhaust 
cleaning systems to reduce air emissions, which vessels shall use in 
case of non-availability of low-sulfur fuels.141 Absent such formal 
recognition of alternative compliance measures, the solution to avoid 
regulative penalties would be to store up compliant fuels at ports 
along the voyage when compliant fuel is available. However, for 
foreign flagged ships which are registered in countries where low-
sulfur fuel is likely to be unavailable and do not have predictable 
schedules to visit U.S. ports, they seem to have little incentive to 
purchase more low-sulfur fuel than what is necessary to sail out of 
the ECA.142 When such vessels decide to visit U.S. ports again, they 
may have to change planned voyages to buy low-sulfur fuel since the 
compliant fuel is unlikely to be readily available at their departing 
terminals.143 Otherwise, they would likely face criminal charges for a 
“knowing violation” in the United States.144 
                                                 
139   Low-Sulfur Marine Fuel in the Pipeline, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 4, 2010, 
10:56 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-
09/04/content_15731857.htm (PetroChina planned to expand its provision of low-
sulfur bunker to Yangshan port near Shanghai to satisfy increased demand). 
140   See TETRA TECH, supra note 137, at 68-72; DET NORSKE VERITAS 
(DNV), supra note 49, at 15 (highly uncertain as to whether the availability of low 
sulfur fuel will be adequate in worldwide ports); KOMLENIC ET AL., supra note 138, 
at 57; Starcrest Consulting Grp., Evaluation of Low Sulfur Marine Fuel Availability 
– Pacific Rim 3 (2005), available at http://webcache.googleuser 
content.com/search?q=cache:E8b1JJZr3g4J:www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/RE
PORT_Fuel_Study_Pacific_Rim_Exec_Sum.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.  
141   MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1. 
142   See generally Deal, supra note 41, at 4 (ECA compliant fuel, blend of 
marine distillates and ultra low sulfur diesel, is about 25% to 30% more expensive 
than the marine distillate fuel that is currently used in TOTE ships). 
143   See id. (there is currently not enough distillate fuel to meet global 
demand for the world’s entire commercial fleet to switch from residual fuel oil to 
distillate fuel to meet fuel standards when operating in ECAs). 
144   See supra text companying notes 73-87. 
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Additionally, shipping companies have been using “slow-
steaming,” a technique that emerged along with the soaring fuel 
prices in 2002 and global environmental movement for greenhouse 
gas reduction, to reduce fuel cost.145 Some voyages now take longer 
than they used to.146 The increased expenditure on fuels to comply 
with Annex VI would only make this practice more prevalent, at least 
in the short term. As such, an enforcement regime that structures 
itself around the “panacea” of criminal liability, 147 coupled with 
issues associated with the availability of low-sulfur fuel and the cost-
saving culture of the shipping industry, is likely to operate contrary to 
the intent of Annex VI of preserving the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas.148 
3.  Deficiencies viewed from the U.S. perspective. - Litigation arising 
from the enforcement of Annex VI on specific vessels has been silent 
except for suits against the creation of ECA.149 Given that the 
memorandum between the EPA and the Coast Guard to enforce 
Annex VI was only signed in 2012,150 current enforcement venue can 
                                                 
145   See Remarks of Christopher Koch, supra note 133; RASMUS 
JORGENSON, SLOW STEAMING: THE FULL STORY, MAERSK 2, available at 
http://www.maersk.com/Innovation/WorkingWithInnovation/Documents/Slow
%20Steaming%20-%20the%20full%20story.pdf.  
146   See Ronald D. White, Ocean Shipping Lines Cut Speed to Save Fuel Costs, 
L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/31/business/la-fi-
slow-sailing-20100731 (some freighters were taking fifteen days to make a Pacific 
crossing that used to take eleven days). 
147   See Keho, supra note 128, at 41 (the U.S. Department of Justice has 
used a two-pronged approach that involves the prosecution of both the corporate 
ship operators and chief engineers or other supervisory crew members as the best 
way of changing the non-compliance culture and increasing deterrence in the 
shipping industry); Darmody, supra note 119, at 143. 
148   See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 2.2 (no 
delay or change of planned voyages shall be required to achieve compliance). 
149   See Alaska v. Kerry, No. 3:12-cv-00142-SLG, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 
133687, at 21-100 (D. Alaska 2013) (State of Alaska sued the Secretary of States 
and the EPA for the designation of ECA under the APPs and the Administrative 
Procedure Act but the suit was dismissed by the court).  
150   Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast 
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding 
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
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be presumed to be primarily administrative. 151  But the effective 
administration of compliance by foreign flagged vessels, especially 
those registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully enforced 
and do not participate regularly in the U.S. commerce, is likely to 
become more difficult. 
As the Annex VI enforcement scheme rolls out, incidents 
where “knowing violation” could be established are likely to increase, 
despite the deterrence effect of criminal charges. On the one hand, 
the number of foreign flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports is likely to 
increase continuously.152 The total number of vessels of the top 
twenty-five flags of registry was 28,178 as of January 31, 2013, 
increased by 14% of the total in 2010.153 This 14% increase comes 
almost entirely from countries and regions where no ECAs are 
designated.154 On the other hand, the situation of low-sulfur fuel 
shortages and lack of regulation on engine designs is likely to 
continue due to some foreign countries’ reluctance to adopt 
regulations to enforce Annex VI during the next few years.155 Many 
vessels might still choose to keep their businesses as usual, especially 
if they do not spend much time in ECAs. Furthermore, “knowing 
violation” is a low threshold for finding criminal liability, 156 
                                                 
151   See generally KLEIN, supra note 114, at 17-28 (violations of MARPOL 
standards are largely revealed by reviewing of ship logs and reports from citizen 
observations; as such, a large number of violations may not be detected).  
152   See America’s Ports: Gateways to Global Trade, AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES (2013), http://www.aapa-
ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1022 (by 2020, the total volume of 
cargo shipped by water is expected to be double that of 2001 volumes). 
153   U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Top 25 Flag of Registry (Sept 27, 2013), 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_S
tatistics.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).  
154   Id. These countries and regions include Liberia, Marshall Islands, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, China, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, and Malaysia. 
Id. 
155   See supra section III, C, 2.   
156   See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The 
Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. 
REV. 1223, 1235 (2009) (numerous commentators criticized that the Congress had 
reduced the mental state requirement for environmental crime when it changed the 
“willfulness” standard to the “knowingly” standard, and the number of 
environmental criminal cases surged because of the adoption of this standard); see 
also Wesley D. Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for 
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considering the practical difficulties for some vessels to obtain means 
to achieve compliance. Courts have also been relaxing the standard of 
proof to establish the required mens rea in environmental crime 
cases. 157  Such a relaxed threshold for finding criminal liability 
expands prosecutorial discretion,158 which could counterbalance the 
deterrence effect of these environmental laws. 
To deter crimes, one fundamental economic theory is that the 
expected cost of punishments on the violators should exceed the 
gains from violation.159 If p is the possibility of being criminally 
charged and M is the monetary loss incurred because of the criminal 
charge and eventual penalties, the expected cost of punishments is 
p×M.160 For vessel owners, the gain from a violation is primarily the 
avoided capital investment in the air emission control measures to 
maintain the operational cost at the pre-regulation level. If such 
capital investment is C, non-compliance seems to be more attractive 
economically if C > p×M. 
To enhance the deterrence effect, enforcement agencies 
could try to increase p, the possibility of a criminal charge. A major 
                                                 
Limiting the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95, 104 
(2007) (culpability should be established based on a higher level of mens rea than 
“knowing” violation considering that courts do not require the knowledge of the 
environmental law at issue, the seriousness of the penalties, and the complexity of 
the environmental laws).   
157   See Darmody, supra note 119, at 122-26. 
158   Uhlmann, supra note 156, at 1242. 
159   Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) 
THE J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 169, 180 (1968).  
160   This formula is adapted from Becker’s proposal. In Becker’s 
formula, the cost of punishments is the probability of conviction multiplied by 
costs to the offender. But deterrence should arguably take effect when an offender 
thinks of the possibility of being served by a court order. So the actual cost of 
punishments could be distorted since the actual conviction is also affected by many 
technicalities of the trial process, and tends to be smaller than the probability of 
being charged. These technicalities of the trial process might not play in the minds 
of offenders when they learn the charges through word of mouth and media 
exposure, and feel being deterred. Alternatively, the cost of punishment may be 
magnified if it is calculated based on the probability of detection, because the 
discretion of government agencies and whistleblowers tend to make the actual 
number of criminal proceedings brought against the offenders less than the 
number of detected violations.   
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implication is on agency budget because criminal convictions are 
generally more costly than agency adjudication.161 Also, enforcing the 
implementation of corrective action plans, as in the Ionia case, could 
be lengthy.162 If no additional budget is allocated, agencies might be 
left with wide prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to bring an 
enforcement proceeding. 163  Courts are generally deferential to 
prosecutor discretion164 as it is a function of resource allocation, 
policy considerations, and the delegation of power from Congress to 
allow agencies to resolve the ambiguity of the statute.165 However, 
even though foreign defendants are unlikely to prevail on claims 
challenging such agency discretion in prosecuting Annex VI 
violations, reputational criticisms from the public against such 
practices may emerge, ultimately compromising the integrity of the 
enforcement regime. 
Alternatively, the severity of penalties could be raised through 
judicial discretion to increase the cost of punishment, p×M. But, the 
shipping industry has been using a controversial arrangement called 
                                                 
161   See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J. OF LAW AND SOCIETY 389, 
405, 415 (2008) (raising the probability of detection is costly); see also Wesley D. 
Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for Limiting the Use of 
Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95 (2007) (a criminal justice 
system is more costly than using administrative law to protect the environment). 
162   See Sherman, supra note 161, at 85-88. 
163   See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and 
the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2002) (prosecutorial discretion 
became a concern when the Environmental Crimes Section of the Department of 
Justice refused to prosecute a substantial number of referrals from EPA and 
refused to consent to some prosecutions sought by local U.S. Attorneys); see 
generally Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law, 
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3-4 (2004) (environmental administrators and 
the prosecutors to whom they refer criminal cases together enjoy very broad 
prosecutorial discretion, limited primarily by the Constitution and the rules of 
prosecutorial ethics). 
164   See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1984) (holding 
non-mutual collateral estoppel does not apply to governmental litigant); see also 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (“the good sense of 
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries 
must be trusted”). 
165   See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the 
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2407, 2453, 2456, 2460 (1995).   
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“one-ship” companies to limit their exposure to liability.166 Under 
such arrangements, shipping carriers are shielded behind the 
corporate veil by organizing companies for the sole and explicit 
purpose of owning that ship.167 The limited capital of such shell 
companies is likely to hinder the fulfillment of judgment, particularly 
concerning the payment of huge criminal fines. Moreover, unlike the 
compensation and penalty calculation in oil spill cases, the estimation 
of the economic harm to third parties caused by inhaling additional 
air pollutants such as SOx and NOx from a vessel tend to be more 
speculative, primarily because of the considerable lapse between 
exposure to air pollutants and actual formulation of diseases, 
numerous intervening causes, and the difficulties in measuring the 
scale of harmful level of exposure. Hence, non-monetary sanctions 
seem to be a more pragmatic redress to Annex VI violations.168 
As to the capital investments by foreign vessels to achieve 
compliance, C, the EPA could play only a limited role except for 
trying to engage industries to provide sufficient low-sulfur fuels. 
Foreign manufacturers and buyers of ocean-going vessels169 would 
have to decide together who should bear the up-front cost of 
advanced design170 if the buyers intend that their ships meet Annex 
VI standards. 171  The buyers also need to take into account 
                                                 
166   KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 34-35. 
167   Id. 
168   See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J.L. & SOC’Y 389, 405 (2008). 
169   See generally MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 207 (China has 
surpassed Japan in 2006 in ship building. South Korea, in 2009, became a main 
player in the global ship building industry, exporting ships to about 169 countries 
and regions, mainly to Asia and Europe). 
170   See generally ALAN E. BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHIPPING 28 (8th ed. 
2007) (in choosing the type of ship to be built, the ship-owner must consider the 
primary trade in which she is to operate, which governs the size and propelling 
machinery, and the cost and availability of fuel, the length and duration of voyages, 
minimum carrying capacity required, and other technical and statutory 
considerations); see also Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136, 147 (switching to 
LNG would increase shipbuilding costs by 20 to 25%). 
171   See MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 202, 214 (government 
subsidies and favorable loads, mandatory requirements on domestic ocean going 
ship buyers to order ships at domestic yards, and cheap labor are the main reasons 
for China’s high-order book volumes).   
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technological developments and associated uncertainties 172 during 
the time lapse between the order and delivery.173 In many countries, 
governments are extending generous credit facilities, subsidies, 
favorable tax treatment, and direct investment grants to maintain 
their national yards as competitive in the global market.174 These 
financial instruments, at the discretion of foreign governments, could 
be powerful instruments to impose Annex VI compliance conditions. 
In contrast, the regulative authority of a U.S. government agency 
appears pale in these contract negotiations. 
III.        MAKING “ENDS” MEET 
A.         The Need for Market-Based Requirements 
Previous discussions on the deficiencies of the Annex VI 
enforcement regime indicate that certain additional elements may be 
necessary to change the weights of the two sides of the formula. An 
option that is within the control of the EPA is to provide incentives, 
so that C – I < p×M, where I is the monetary incentives obtained 
from participating in governmental programs. 
Programs that are initiated by the government and industry 
leaders to provide incentives to induce wider voluntary compliance 
based on market-based principles, often referred to as Market-Based 
Mechanisms (MBMs), are not new in the United States.175 MBMs 
                                                 
172   See Frederick Adamchak & Amokeye Adede, LNG AS MARINE 
FUEL, 7 (Gas Technology Institute training materials, 2013) (one main problem 
with using LNG as marine fuel is the “chicken-and-egg” situation between ship 
owners. This is when developers for LNG fueling infrastructures and ports remain 
uncertain as to who would and should act first), available at 
http://www.gastechnology.org/ Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/7-1-
Frederick _Adamchak.pdf.  
173   World Shipping Council, The Liner Shipping Industry and Carbon 
Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (ships are often ordered in a set of four to ten. Moreover, 
they are ordered three or more years in advance of delivery), available at 
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_co2emissions_policy_septemb
er.pdf. 
174   BRANCH, supra note 170, at 481.  
175   See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-2 (2006) 
(RECLAIM is the first trading program in the national created to reduce SO2 and 
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provide business operators means to reduce compliance costs as 
much as possible176 while the industrial standard is under transition 
in response to regulative changes.177 MBMs would also likely reduce 
the practical disparities for shipping companies when they operate 
worldwide, and eventually help overcome the political difficulties in 
bringing comparable environmental standards to all voyages’ end 
destinations. 
MBMs are most suitable when the emission standards can be 
achieved through alternative technologies and the cost of emission 
abatement differs widely among regulated sources.178 Both of these 
conditions are present in the case of enforcing Annex VI. In addition 
to fuel-switching,179 the industry has also identified several alternative 
technologies including selective catalytic reduction systems, humid air 
motor systems, seawater scrubbers, and using LNG-fueled vessels.180 
                                                 
NOx emissions in urban areas), available at 
www.epa.gov/airmarket/resource/docs/ reclaimoverview.pdf. 
176   See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 2-3 (Karl-Göran Mäler et al. eds., 2001) 
(holding all firms to the same environmental target/standard can be expensive and 
sometimes counterproductive). 
177   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 132 (2006) (ship emission trading could offer a way of 
complying on short notice, as a transition mechanism in the face of increasingly 
stringent regulations on a range of emissions from ship. The cost and long service 
life of cargo vessels may render regulations that require drastic changes of industrial 
standards within few years impracticable); See World Shipping Council, The Liner 
Shipping Industry and Carbon Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (a container ship capable of 
carrying 8,500 TEU’s costs approximately $100 million (USD) and will be used for 
20 to 25 years), available at http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/ 
liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf. 
178   See James J. Corbett et al., AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM REGIONAL FERRIES: TECHNICAL 
MEMORANDUM TWO 14-15 (2004), available at 
http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/documents/ProgEval.FerryEmissions.pdf.  
179   See generally Theo Notteboom et al., ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2010) (alternative fuels 
include low-sulfur fuel oil, marine gas oil, marine diesel oil), available at www.schone 
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf. 
180   Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141; see also ENNIO CODAN ET 
AL., IMO III EMISSION REGULATION: IMPACT ON THE TURBOCHARGING SYSTEM 
2-3 (2010), available at 
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Studies show that depending on the vessel’s conditions, the cost-
effectiveness of the same technology varies. Generally, compliance by 
bigger vessels is less expensive than smaller vessels.181 Compared 
with fuel switching, NOx abatement technologies take longer to 
introduce because they usually take about ten years to be amortized, 
and hence, more risk-taking is involved in investment.182 Vessels that 
approach the end of their service life183 or those that spend a small 
portion of service time inside ECAs are likely to struggle the most 
under the current Annex VI enforcement scheme.184 It has been 
reported that some shipping carriers have started passing the 
increased compliance cost on to customers. 185  The increased 
shipping price, an unintended effect of Annex VI, calls for the well-
recognized flexibilities that MBMs could offer.186 
                                                 
http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot267.nsf/veritydisplay/1abd7848c784998
1852578110051bee0/$file/IMO%20III%20Emission%20Regulation.pdf. 
181   KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 13. 
182   Id.  
183   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 26 (it is better for infrequent 
visitors or ships with few remaining years in operation to just pay for the costs of 
pollution); PER KÅGESON, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING SHIPPING 
EMISSIONS: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 10 (2006) (abatement of SOx 
differs from that of NOx because a shift to low sulfur fuel might still be cost 
effective even for ships that are approaching the end of their operation life), 
available at www.airclim.org/sites/default/files/ documents/apc24_0.pdf. 
184   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006). 
185   See Jim Romeo, New IMO Low-Sulfur Fuel Regulations Creating 
Challenges for Vessel Operator, PROF’L MARINER (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.professional mariner.com/December-January-2013/New-IMO-low-
sulfur-fuel-regs-creating-challenges-for-vessel-operators/ (ZIM Integrated Shipping 
Services Ltd. said that it will implement a low-sulfur fuel charge of $20 (USD) per 
20-foot equivalent unit for trade between North Europe/Mediterranean and all 
North American coasts in both directions); see also Michiel Vervloet, Emission 
Trading in the Shipping Industry: Where Goes/Is the Money? (Dec. 5, 2010) 
(unpublished Masters’ thesis, Ghent University) (on file with University Library, 
Ghent University), at 11. 
186   See generally T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental 
Regulation, 6(1) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 18, 30 (1990) (because emissions 
trading allows the issue of who will pay for the pollution from who will install 
pollution control measures, it introduces additional flexibility). 
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B.         Possible Market-Based Mechanisms (MBMs) 
MBMs could be categorized broadly as emission charges or 
emission trading regimes.187 Based on the “polluters pay” principal, 
emission charges could take the form of a tax, an abatement subsidy, 
or differentiated service fees. 188  Sweden pioneered differentiated 
fairway dues at ports to encourage reductions in NOx and SO2 
emissions at ports since 1998.189 Because all major ports participated 
in this program, adverse economic impacts, if any, on port businesses 
have not been evident.190 Norway launched a NOx tax, forming a 
funding pool, which provides grants to fund vessels to apply 
emission reduction technologies.191 Without getting into details, two 
main concerns arise if a MBM is designed that voluntarily imposes 
additional dues based on the environmental performance of vessels. 
First, the program would risk diluting the force of Annex VI 
enforcement regime by shifting the focus on vessels to ports, 
weakening the regime’s deterrence effects. Adequate levels of 
regulative pressure on foreign vessel owners should be maintained 
since they have to invest in emission control measures eventually. 
Second, viewed from ship owners’ standpoint, the purpose of the 
environmental charges duplicates that of the civil penalties under 
APPS. 
Therefore, this comment focuses on the other two main types 
of emission trading schemes: cap-and-trade and emission credit 
trading. This comment argues in favor of an emission credit trading 
mechanism based on a consumption-emission formula. This MBM 
                                                 
187   See DAVID HARRISON ET AL., ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR 
REDUCING SHIPS EMISSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 9, 29, 45, 66 (2005), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/task3_final.pdf; Tietenberg, 
supra note 186, at 18-21.  
188   See JINHUA ZHAO, IRREVERSIBLE ABATEMENT INVESTMENT 
UNDER COST UNCERTAINTIES: TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS AND EMISSIONS 
CHARGES 18 (2000), available at http://www.card.iastate.edu/ 
publications/dbs/pdffiles/00wp252.pdf; see also Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 20-
21.   
189   HARRISON ET AL., supra note 187, at 45-46 (Germany, Finland, and 
the State of Alaska also have such environmental programs at their ports). 
190   KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 16. 
191   Id. at 34-35. 
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could be offered to the violator as a final leniency before the 
prosecutor brings a criminal proceeding. 
1.  Cap-and-Trade (Allowance Trading). - Under a cap-and-trade 
scheme, the regulatory body sets a figurative cap for total emission 
on the industry, and allocates emission allowances to participating 
companies, which are the existing pollution sources.192 Companies 
may continue to emit pollution as permitted by the pollution amount 
prescribed by the allowances until the allowances expire. When the 
initial allowances run out, the companies are supposed to purchase 
un-used allowance from other companies, which manage to reduce 
emissions through improved technologies.193 The government might 
auction off the allowances to the highest bidders or, in a 
corresponding amount to the polluter’s historical emission data, free 
of charge.194 
Studies on cap-and-trade programs indicate that vessels could 
potentially decrease a considerable amount of the cost on emission 
control technologies through participation in such programs.195 For 
SO2 emission reduction, a market-based approach that allows vessels 
in ECAs to either undertake fuel switching, install exhaust cleaning 
systems, or purchase SO2 emission allowances from other vessels 
could save each vessel up to $63 million (USD), annually.196 
One option is to create an emission cap based on 
geographical area. Under this scenario, a macro-level design issue is 
                                                 
192   See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-6 (2006); 
Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 18-20.  
193   Id.  
194   See generally Sergey Paltsev et al., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-AND-
TRADE PROPOSALS 4-5 (2007) (the free distribution of allowances to upstream 
entities may create an inequitable outcome whereby the emission costs are passed 
on to downstream fuel users. Meanwhile, the revenue from auctioning permits 
could be directed to those who ultimately bear the cost of abatement), available at 
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/38460/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf
?sequence=1. 
195   See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 151. 
196   Wang et al., supra note 42, at 8233, 8235 (the estimation is based on 
analysis of U.S. foreign commerce ships traveling in European or U.S. West Coast 
ECAs). 
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whether emission trading between different sectors should be 
permitted. Some researchers’ answer is an ambitious “yes.”197 As an 
initial matter, a sufficient number of participating entities are required 
to keep the allowance trading market active.198 Permitting vessels to 
trade with land-based emission sources not only ensures the scale of 
the market, but also benefits the shipping industry substantially since 
abatement costs for shipping are lower than that for land-based 
installations in general.199 However, an over-inclusive trading scheme 
might give more room for companies to buy allowances or use basic 
cost-saving measures rather than being induced to invest in green 
technologies. 200  To determine whether the participating vessels 
would become “lazy” under such a program, an in-depth analysis of 
the emission reduction capacities of different sectors, which operate 
under quite different environmental and technical standards, would 
be required. 
Another option is to impose a cap on the shipping industry 
itself. A major concern about the cap-and-trade mechanism is its 
economic impact on the shipping industry as a whole.201 Reliance on 
ocean shipping to transport goods internationally is expected to rise, 
because ocean shipping is already one of the most economically and 
environmentally efficient modes of long-distance transportation.202 
                                                 
197   See KRISTINA HOLMGREN ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
TRADING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 69 (2006), available at http://www3. 
ivl.se/rapporter/pdf/B1703.pdf. 
198   See EPA Clean Air Markets Division, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 17-18 (2006) 
(RECLAIM is criticized for not being an actually active market with few entities 
participating in its trading actions). 
199   HOLMGREN ET AL., supra note 197, at 69. 
200   Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental 
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 231, 275-85 (1999).   
201   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9-10 (2009), available at http://www. 
worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf. 
202   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9, (2009), available at http://www.world 
shipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf; see 
also KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 7 (the biggest contributor to marine pollution 
is land-based sources and pollutions from ships contributes a relative small fraction 
of the overall marine pollution (12%)). 
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Posing emission caps on the shipping industry is likely to force the 
industry to eventually purchase allowance from other sectors where 
similar cap-and-trade mechanisms apply.203 As such, a large amount 
of money would flow into other sectors that are not subject to the 
same air emission standards as the shipping industry.204 The emission 
reduction in other sectors would be a proxy to verify the 
effectiveness of emission control measures in the shipping industry. 
The result would probably be an “open-ended” regime where the 
actual emission reduction becomes difficult to track. 
Further, a cap-and-trade mechanism might not be effective in 
terms of engaging new polluters. Experience of the Acid Raid 
Program of SOs trading shows that most of the trading under the 
Program has been internal, namely, acquiring excess allowances from 
within the company, rather than inter-regional or inter-company.205 
If a cap-and-trade mechanism were applied to the shipping industry, 
large international shipping companies, which are already leading the 
industry’s emission reduction endeavors, would possibly prefer 
obtaining extra allowances internally to avoid delays and transaction 
costs. As a result, there might not be enough active allowances for 
trade with new ships. 
2.  Emission credit trading. - A more straightforward model is 
to focus on the difference in emissions between vessels, targeting the 
non-compliant vessels.206 The emission credit trading mechanism 
would require the establishment of a baseline of different ship 
models in terms of the correlation between the power output and the 
amount of pollutant emission.207 Alternatively, correlation could be 
                                                 
203   WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND 
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY 9 (2009). 
204   See also IMO, Review of MBMs: Consolidated Proposal of Efficiency 
Incentive Scheme (EIS) Based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) and the Vessel Efficiency 
Systems (VES), Submitted by Japan and the World Shipping Council, GHG-WG 3/3/2 
(Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www. worldshipping.org/industry-
issues/environment/air-emissions/Japan_-_WSC_Consolidated_Proposal__GHG-
WG_3-3-2.pdf. 
205   Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable 
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principals, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 
488-92 (2000).  
206   See Vervloet, supra note 185, at 33. 
207   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 24. 
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established between the energy efficiency index of a ship208 or a 
modification of the index,209 and the amount of pollutant emission 
for the determination of the baseline. Trading entities should be 
primarily vessels. The participation by ship manufacturers should be 
limited or even prohibited, because the estimation of emission 
amount would be too speculative before the vessel is put into 
operation.210 
The amount of credits that a vessel obtains would be 
determined on the amount of deviation of the vessel’s performance 
from this baseline. The most powerful credit generators are large 
vessels that operate in ECAs for their entire service time. The 
purchasers who would benefit most from this scheme would be 
vessels that spend a small portion of their time inside ECAs.211 Non-
compliant vessels could be offered to opt-in to this trading 
mechanism; or else criminal proceedings would likely be brought. 
This offer could also be made during the plea bargaining stage.212 
Such offer should be conditioned on the facts that render the 
immediate implementation of compliant measures not cost-effective, 
such as the fact that the vessel is approaching its service life. 
Although, such program design requires a large volume of record 
keeping, it is nevertheless necessary for conveying a clear message to 
the polluters: this offer in lieu of criminal proceeding is not a way 
                                                 
208   See IMO, Amendments to the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 
1978 Relating Thereto (Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships in MARPOL 
Annex VI), Resolution MEPC.203(62) (July 15, 2011). The regulation requires ships 
to be certified based on an assessment of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) 
and all ships shall have Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plans. The EEDI is a 
non-prescriptive, performance-based mechanism that leaves the choice of 
technologies to the industry, as long as the required energy efficiency level provide 
in Regulations 20 and 21 is attained. The amendment came into force on January 1, 
2013. Id. 
209   See Vervloet, supra note 185 at 33-34. 
210   Id. 
211   See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective, 
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006). 
212   See also James B. Nelson, Alternative Sentencing under the MARPOL 
Protocol: Using Polluters’ Fines to Fund Environmental Restoration, 10 HASTINGS W.-N. 
W.J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 1, 23-26 (2003) (advocating the use of alternative sentencing 
provisions to MARPOL prosecutions to provide funding for clean-up projects to 
correct the harm caused by the defendant’s actions).   
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through which vessels could pay to pollute, but only a regulative 
mercy considering the violator’s economic hardship. 
Additionally, participating foreign-flagged vessels should be 
required to designate local agents for service of process. 213  An 
independent trans-governmental authority could be established to 
monitor and verify the quality of credits.214 This entity could be 
financed through the civil penalties collected from the non-compliant 
ships. 
C.         General Considerations on MBMs 
Ideally, the MBM should be built under a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and its major waterborne trade partners 
that have not enforced Annex VI in full, such as China. Although 
treaties and executive agreements are treated alike under international 
law, an executive agreement would be preferable from a U.S. point of 
view, because no advice and consent of the Senate would be required 
as long as the executive agreement does not contradict statutory 
provisions.215 The EPA would have the authority to run this trading 
program under the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act, which 
added Title IV, relating to controlling acid deposition including SOx 
and NOx.
216 
Manifestly, the influence of a governmental agency, acting on 
its own, is rather limited when its ultimate purpose is to induce 
domestic legislation in a foreign country. Therefore, the overall 
structure of a bilateral agreement would lay a stronger foundation for 
the subsequent agreements on the technical parameters of the MBM; 
                                                 
213   See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN 
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN 
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 1, 8 
(2007). 
214   See also Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading 
Programs into New Areas of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 117 
(2000). 
215   See Kathryn C. Wilson, The International Air Quality Management 
District: Is Emissions Trading the Innovative Solution to the Transboundary Pollution Problem?, 
30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 369, 384-85 (1995).  
216   1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
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the discussion of which could be led by agencies in the respective 
countries. Further, high-level official negotiation is more likely to 
identify and define the necessary flexibilities to connect the priorities 
of the United States and targeted foreign countries in controlling air 
pollutions. Given the facilitation by national governments, as 
opposed to administrative agencies delegated with the authority to 
enforce Annex VI under national laws, companies are more likely to 
agree upon the qualifying emission reduction measures to meet the 
same emission standards under Annex VI. 
Finally, two important technical components need to be 
agreed upon under the bilateral agreement. The first component to 
be established is the eligible equivalents. 217  A clear mutual 
understanding of equivalents would not only help keep the trading 
market active,218 but also benefit the later monitoring and verification 
of emission credits during implementation. The second component 
to be clarified is the monitoring and reporting procedures. Safeguards 
need to be established to prevent fraud and missed reporting, and 
furthermore, to ensure information transparency.219 When necessary, 
penalties should be imposed on repetitive violation of reporting 
rules.220 
CONCLUSIONS 
The current U.S. regulatory scheme to enforce Annex VI 
leaves an administrative vacuum in terms of ensuring foreign-flagged 
vessels’ compliance when operating in U.S. waters. The conventional 
combination of civil penalties and criminal charges is challenged 
when the enforcement of international environmental law is achieved 
through an uneven worldwide regulatory landscape and depends 
                                                 
217   See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 18. 
218   See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 149 (switching to 1% sulfur 
residuals, without other alternative compliance measures, has the major 
disadvantage in that it does not create cost efficient credits for trading in the 
emissions’ markets). 
219   See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN 
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN 
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 5, 1-3 
(2007).  
220   Id. at 9-10. 
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heavily on the technological developments in the private sector. This 
comment recommends an emission credit trading mechanism as a 
supplement to the current Annex VI enforcement regime. The credit 
trading mechanism would encourage firms, based on their superior 
knowledge about the market and effectiveness of various 
technological options, to find the best solution in response to the 
regulative requirements without compromising their valued 
commercial interests. If the establishment of a credit trading 
mechanism is initiated through high-level official dialogues, as 
recommended by this comment, the U.S. enforcement agencies 
would be afforded a proper platform to work with foreign agencies 
to establish compliance equivalents under Annex VI. MBMs, 
therefore, would serve an important role in making the current rigid 
enforcement regime more adaptive during the transition period 
where firms are yet to phase out substandard vessels and plan for 
investments in vessel designs that are far more environmentally 
friendly. 
 
